Believers
in an objective, rational ethic, such as natural law theorists, think that it
is possible for human ends to be evaluated and judged rationally, and that the
discipline of ethics is the science tasked with doing so. On the other hand,
utilitarians think that only means, not ends, can be rationally evaluated, and
can be evaluated solely based on whether they are or are not conducive to the
ends chosen by the individual. It doesn’t matter what these ends are, as long
as the individual desires to achieve them.
The argument
that I will make regarding this issue will be based on the following four
premises:
1. We know that everyone’s ultimate end is happiness,
defined in the broadest possible sense.
2. We also know that value is to a large extent
subjective. Different things make different people happy in different ways and
to different extents.
3. We know that subjective tastes and preferences are
not held absolutely constant over people’s lifetime though. They are subject to
modification by the conscious action of the person; they are not determined
absolutely by his genetic code. For instance, if they work at it, most people
can eventually develop an enjoyment for fine wine where before they had none,
or even start to enjoy what they do for a living though they started out not
enjoying it. Consciously delving into an intellectual subject can produce an
interest in that subject and an enjoyment for studying that subject, where
before there was none.
4. Anyone that wants to be alive in the period
designated as the ‘long-run’ must consider long-run as well as short-run
effects when evaluating a potential action, if he wants to obtain the greatest
amount of lifetime happiness, everyone’s ultimate end.
Based
on these premises, the utilitarian and the objective ethicist positions can be
partially reconciled by realizing that many ends are also means that can
produce either good or bad consequences in the long-run, with a greater or
lesser degree of probability of producing those consequences.
As
such, we can say that it is objectively better to obtain happiness from
proximate ends that also serve as means to other good proximate ends that
produce more happiness in later periods, than to obtain the same amount of
immediate happiness from proximate ends that eventually result in the
production of evils and unhappiness. For example, if one person obtained a
certain amount of happiness from the proximate end of eating spinach, while
another person obtained the same amount of happiness from the proximate end of
eating fried chicken (unrealistically assuming for the moment that happiness
can be measured and compared interpersonally), the taste and preference of the
first person is objectively better than that of the second person because of
the long-run health consequences of satisfying those respective desires for
food. If one can actually do it, it would thus be more beneficial to develop a
fondness for healthy foods, other things equal, than for unhealthy foods, if
one cares about being healthy in the long-run.
The
same kind of reasoning applies to actions having a bearing on societal harmony and
productivity. Everyone interested in any measure of long-run happiness that is
even remotely reliant on material goods is interested in the maintenance of a
peaceful and productive social order. As such, if one person obtained a certain
amount of happiness from the proximate end of buying consumption goods with
money earned through work and trade, while another obtained the same amount of
happiness from the proximate end of buying consumption goods with money earned
through theft, extortion, and fraud, the taste and preference of the first
person is objectively better than that of the second person because of the
respective long-run societal consequences of satisfying their desires in these different
manners.
The
difference between this and the foregoing example is that here we must include
in our assessment the risk of a principle of action being universalized, and
the effects that this universalization would have on the social order. Every
time one member of society engages in an individually beneficial action that
has bearings on the rules governing the social order, it becomes more probable
that this kind of behavior will become a general kind of behaviour throughout
that society. Thus, the first person benefitting himself through work and trade
will make it more likely that benefitting oneself through work and trade will
become a general societal behaviour, a general principle of action that is
conducive to a peaceful and prosperous social order. The second person
benefitting himself, in the short run, through theft, extortion, and fraud will
make it more likely that benefitting oneself through theft, extortion, and
fraud will become a general societal behaviour, a general principle of action
that leads to the disintegration of society, war, and poverty. These long-run,
probabilistic effects need to be considered when rationally evaluating a course
of action. This was obviously not done by any member of the legions of special
interest pleaders that so plague modern politics and make everyone, including
themselves, worse off because of their contributions to establishing political
special interest privilege-seeking as a general (societally harmful) principle
of action.
Essentially,
the principle for objectively evaluating proximate ends is this: do they
harmonize with other, perhaps more long-run, interests of the actor, or do they
conflict with these interests? If an individual has the ability to engage in
conscious action to modify his tastes and preferences, a capacity which most
individuals have with regards to a number of their tastes and preferences, it
would be rational for him to try to direct his tastes and preferences towards
proximate ends that harmonize with other, long-run proximate ends. By doing so,
he can more effectively and consistently pursue the ultimate end of all members
of humanity, which is the maximization of happiness, broadly defined.
While
ultimately we cannot rationally determine which particular proximate ends make
all of humanity ‘truly happy’, because this will differ based on subjective
considerations and ‘true happiness’ is a bit of an arbitrary term, we can
rationally say that one proximate end is better than another, if they result in
the same amount of individual happiness, and that one taste/preference for a
kind of proximate end is better than another and ought to be cultivated if
possible. This is because most proximate ends also serve either as means to
other good proximate ends, or are the cause of negative effects. Having a taste
for the former is objectively better than having a taste for the latter,
because the former harmonizes with other happiness-producing phenomena, while
the latter are disharmonious in that, while perhaps producing short-run
happiness, their long-run effect is misery.
Thus,
most proximate ends can be rationally compared after all, not in their capacity
as ends but in their capacity as means or causes, and since all ends are
proximate except for the ultimate end of happiness broadly defined, which is
the same for all of mankind, then some of the claims of the believers in an
objective, rational ethic are actually pretty justified.
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