Within
the realm of morality we can distinguish two broad categories of moral tenets.
The first are moral tenets, the general observance of which we believe would
result in greater well-being for most members of society, and which we believe
would best be enforced through physical coercion or the threat thereof, usually
through the agency of a government. We may call these tenets of political
morality. The second are moral tenets, the general observance of which we
believe would result in greater societal well-being for most members of
society, but which we believe would best not be enforced through physical
coercion or the threat thereof, but rather instilled through persuasion and
deterred through the disapprobation of other members of society. We may call
these tenets of personal morality.
Thus,
the ethical thinker has two jobs to accomplish with regards to each moral tenet
he favours. First, he must prove that the general observance of that moral
tenet would result in greater well-being for most members of society. He must
prove the utilitarian credentials of the tenet as a general rule in order to
establish it as a legitimate moral tenet. Secondly, he must try to determine
whether the moral tenet would best be enforced through physical coercion or the
threat thereof, or whether this would be inexpedient and the tenet would best
be operationalized through persuasion and disapprobation. He must determine
whether the tenet should be classified as political or personal morality.
As regular readers of this blog will know by
now, I think that the general observance of the moral tenet of respect for
private property and of general individual freedom from aggressive physical
coercion in most regards, would result in significantly greater well-being for
most members of society than a lack of this observance. I think that because of
its relative clarity as an enforceable moral tenet and because of the serious
danger to other individuals that can result from even a small number of people
who don’t abide by this tenet of morality, this tenet is best enforced through
physical coercion or the threat thereof. I would thus classify this tenet as a
tenet of political morality, and as the pre-eminent one at that.
Nevertheless,
I by no means think that it is the only moral tenet that can be justified on
utilitarian grounds. Others, such as general respect for and politeness towards
others, familial solidarity, non-contractual reciprocity between friends,
showing gratitude when another does favours for you, and more, I also consider
sufficiently backed by utilitarian credentials to count as tenets of morality. But,
as mentioned above, establishing something as a tenet of morality is only half
the job. Because I don’t think that these tenets of morality either can or
should be enforced through physical coercion or the threat thereof, I would
classify them as tenets of personal morality. People who believe in these
tenets should try to convince others to follow them, and can show
disapprobation or can societally alienate those who refuse to follow these
tenets, but they shouldn’t try to enforce these tenets through physical
coercion or the threat thereof.
Why
shouldn’t they be enforced through physical coercion or the threat thereof? Why
should private property rights and rights to individual freedom be enforced
through physical force and tenets such as politeness, familial solidarity, etc…
should not? For the remainder of this post, I will give various reasons why I
think that political morality should by and large be confined to the tenets of
respect for private property and individual freedom, and why many tenets of
‘conservative’ or ‘leftist’ morality discussed today are either not legitimate
tenets of morality at all or should be classified as tenets of personal, not
political, morality.
1. Many tenets of ‘conservative’ or ‘leftist’ morality fail the test of rough direct utility cost-benefit analyses:
Consider
the issue of gay marriage. American conservatives think that homosexuality is
‘unchristian’ and that they should not be allowed to pervert the ‘sacred’
meaning of marriage. Gay marriage is thus, according to conservatives, immoral.
Gay people, on the other hand, typically argue that homosexuality is an
individual characteristic, like race or gender, and possessing an individual
characteristic shouldn’t bar people from getting officially married and
enjoying the benefits thereof. Gay marriage thus has the exact same moral
status as straight marriage.
Let
us now consider the utilitarian credentials of this conservative ‘tenet of
morality’. Whether classed as a tenet of political or personal morality, even
the cost-benefit analysis in terms of direct utility effects is probably
unfavourable to this tenet. If gay marriage is outlawed or generally frowned
upon, then gay people, about 10% of the North American population, are prevented
or seriously discouraged from entering an important, voluntary, mutually
beneficial bond with another, and prevented from enjoying the legal status
thereof. This would probably result in a relatively serious hit to both
people’s happiness, or utility. What is gained by the moral tenet? The
presumably relatively minor benefit of homophobes being able to believe that
they now live in a more ‘moral’ or more ‘Christian’ country, and deriving a
small amount of utility from this belief. The tenet significantly harms gay
people seeking to get married, in order to give homophobes a tiny, perceptual,
benefit. By producing significantly more direct misery than direct happiness,
this ‘moral tenet’ fails the very first utilitarian test that any moral tenet
must go through, and thus must be rejected wholesale.
A similar situation probably applies for
such tenets of ‘conservative’ morality as hatred of pornography, no sex before
marriage, women must be housewives, etc…
It is
not similar when we discuss the respect for private property tenet of morality.
Here, all people who have claims to private property are clearly directly
benefitted, while only those who would like to take away the property of others
are directly harmed. At this superficial direct level, respect for private
property does not yet come away with a resounding utilitarian victory, but it
probably does still win a small one, given that most people experience more
unhappiness from losing what they already have than they experience in
happiness from gaining what they do not yet have, other things equal.
2. Even if they pass the direct utility test, it is less likely that it can be determined that tenets of ‘conservative’ or ‘leftist’ morality definitely have net benefits when enforced as general rules than it is for the tenet of respect for private property:
Consider
a country that could benefit from an increase in its population. In this
country at this time, it is likely that the tenet of ‘conservative’ morality
that contraception and abortion are evil might pass the direct utility test.
Parents may have to put up with some unwanted children, but the rest of the
population gains from the increase in the division of labour and rise in the general
standard of living that this population increase will bring in its wake. With
this, have we proved that this is a legitimate tenet of morality? We have not
yet, because in order to have useful behavioural effects, codes of morality
must be based on general, universal rules, not situational, particularistic
ones. Contraception and abortion are evil, while having many offspring is good,
when in an under-populated country, but contraception and abortion are good,
while having many offspring is evil, when in an over-populated country. This
formulation is highly unsatisfactory as a moral rule because it is too
situational, and will not be accepted as a fixed standard for evaluating good
and evil by the human mind. Rather, if we wish to have a tenet of morality on
the issue, it either has to be: ‘Contraception and abortion are good’, or, ‘Contraception
and abortion are evil’.
If
‘Contraception and abortion are evil’ is accepted as a moral tenet by people
living in an overpopulated country, and especially if accepted by poor people
in an overpopulated country filled by poor people, the results are disastrous,
whether accepted as a tenet of political or of personal morality. It is unclear
whether accepting this tenet as a general, universal rule of morality will
result in net benefits or net costs, it depends in what particular situations
it is applied in most instances. In this case, it is likely that the tenet will
have net costs, since people in under-populated countries will generally be
encouraged by economic forces to have more children anyway even without the
tenet, and the tenet will probably be applied most often and most disastrously
in overpopulated countries by poor people who can least afford it.
The
same does not apply for the tenet of respect for private property. Here, it
applies pretty well in the vast majority of situations, and the net benefits of
adopting it are pretty enormous. All the incentives to produce for the
consumers and to accumulate capital to increase the productivity of the
economic system are activated, things that only respect for private property
applied fairly consistently as a general rule can activate. These benefits are
not really situational or particularistic, but fairly general and universal.
Some minor exceptions might be cases of land monopoly, stubborn hold-outs
blocking infrastructure projects, and people on the verge of death due to poverty,
in which respecting private property does not have good results. In these cases
though, whether some exceptions are made to the moral tenet or whether the
negative results are put up with due to the vast positive benefits of the
general rule, the general rule itself is pretty darn sound and should not be
discarded or compromised lightly.
3. Even if they are legitimate moral tenets, many tenets of morality other than respect for private property tend, if deemed to be tenets of political morality, to set political precedents justifying more and more harmful violations of the tenet of respect for private property:
Consider
the tenet of morality of anti-discrimination. In its current popular form, it
says that businesses, both when hiring employees and when choosing which
customers to serve, should not discriminate based on the race, gender, or
sexual orientation of potential employees or customers. This tenet is deemed by
many to be important enough and clear enough to be enforced as a tenet of
political morality, through ‘civil rights acts’ and other such policies.
Now,
as a tenet of personal morality, and when applied reasonably, the tenet of
anti-discrimination passes the utilitarian tests, both directly and as a
general rule. Discrimination based on largely irrational criteria such as race,
gender, and sexual orientation in business hiring and decision-making means
that more able people will be passed over for the positions in which they can
best serve the consumers based on such irrational criteria. This directly hurts
the person discriminated against, the non-racist/sexist/homophobic stakeholders
of the business, and indirectly hurts all of the world’s consumers, while only
directly benefitting the racist/sexist/homophobic employer or owner. While the
tenet can be pushed too far and applied in unreasonable ways (such as obliging ‘Hooters’
to hire ugly, disabled men as servers), if reasonably qualified the tenet can
serve as a good general rule of personal morality.
Why
just as personal morality, why can’t we legitimately enforce
anti-discrimination as a tenet of political morality? There are two main
reasons why this would be ill-advised. Firstly, enforcing anti-discrimination,
and others like it, as a tenet of political morality means violating the
general rule of respect for private property. Owners of property are forced,
through physical coercion or the threat thereof, to make choices that they
would not otherwise have made with their property. This is something that is
incompatible with a complete right of private property, which means the right
to use the property as the owner sees fit, as long as it is not used to
infringe the similar right of other property owners. If we accept both respect
for private property and anti-discrimination as tenets of political morality,
we have a conflict of tenets.
Secondly,
tenets such as anti-discrimination, because they are only legitimate moral
tenets when applied ‘reasonably’ rather than in all possible cases, can set
some dangerous political precedents if enforced as a tenet of political
morality. These tenets are somewhat ambiguous and situational, and power-hungry
governments could take advantage of this by using prior precedents, based on
the tenet, to justify the further extension of their power in more and more
areas. This would result in further and further compromising the tenet of
respect for private property. In this case, if you can’t discriminate in hiring
or in customer choice, couldn’t the logic extend to preventing ‘discrimination’
in private club membership, friendships, and even in the choice of significant
others or sexual partners? Would a certain percentage of inter-racial marriages
be mandated based on quotas? Also, within hiring, couldn’t the
anti-discrimination categories keep multiplying (race, gender, general beauty,
income status, religion, able/disabled, etc…) until the freedom of the employer
to hire the person they think is most suitable for the job is turned into a
sham? Such extensions are less likely if the tenet remains one of personal morality,
because then each individual can judge for themselves or can persuade others
accordingly, when and in what ways to adhere to the tenet. When government gets
involved, these kinds of tenets can be extended for reasons far different than
reasonableness or advancing the ‘common good’, such as ambition for power over
others or to please loud special-interest groups.
This
kind of reasoning can be applied to quite a few tenets of morality that are
legitimate when they are tenets of personal morality only. Consider the tenet
of morality that taking narcotic drugs that are harmful to the long-run health
of the taker is bad. When governments try to turn this into a tenet of
political morality, not only are laws based on such tenets largely
unenforceable and mainly lead to an increase in criminal activity, but they
also set dangerous political precedents. If narcotics can be prohibited because
of their long-run health consequences, why not unhealthy foods? In fact, why
not just force the populace to eat healthy foods and to do regular exercise, if
concern for the long-run health of people is a legitimate basis for tenets of
political morality? The further the logic of the tenet is extended as a tenet
of political morality, the further from its utilitarian roots the tenet goes,
and the more governments assume tyrannical powers and become contemptuous of
the tenet of respecting private property rights.
Consider the tenet of morality that writing
inflammatory, hateful things based on irrational criteria such as race or
sexual orientation is wrong. All well and good if it remains a tenet of
personal morality, but it becomes dangerous when made a tenet of political
morality. If the government can censor hateful racist or homophobic writings,
why not censor things that religious people find ‘offensive’ and ‘inflammatory’
too, such as atheistic tracts that say that religion is illogical? How bout
politically ‘offensive’ and ‘inflammatory’ writings, shouldn’t they be censored
too? The writings of libertarians are ‘offensive’ to people who believe in
statism or egalitarianism, and are ‘inflammatory’ in calling the government
incompetent and tyrannical. Perhaps these writings should be censored too?
Holocaust denial is hateful and ignorant, the tenet would call for its censorship.
But if so, how about those ‘ignorant’ and ‘fanatical’ Austrian economists who
claim that Roosevelt’s New Deal did not solve the Great Depression, based
solely on their ‘hate’ for governments? (I am speaking as a government censor
here, not as myself obviously). The mighty sword of censorship is simply too
dangerous to leave in the hands of government. People can and should
self-censor based on their own moral senses, and perhaps in some cases based on
the disapprobation of others. The tenet should remain one of personal, not
political, morality.
How
about the tenet of respect for private property, surely it is liable to the
same kinds of abuses when considered a tenet of political morality? In fact it
is, but there are reasons why it is less serious for this tenet than for the
foregoing. The most obvious source of abuse is the question: to what lengths
can the government go to prevent invasions of private property rights or
individual freedoms? After the September 11 attacks, the US government passed
all kinds of laws, in the name of stopping further terrorist attacks, that were
terribly invasive of the privacy of US citizens, and started all kinds of wars
in the Middle East that were terribly detrimental to the persons and property
of people living there. The end of stopping further terrorist attacks was sound,
justified by the sound tenet of respect for private property and individual
freedom, but the means adopted resulted in many governmental invasions of those
very rights they were supposed to be protecting from terrorists. Whether good
intentions or lust for power prompted the government’s action, the result was
an unreasonable interpretation of the tenet of respect for private property.
It
was to combat the potential for such abuses that, in the Anglo-Saxon countries,
such doctrines as the right to a fair trial by jury, innocent until proven
guilty, and rigorous search warrant requirements, were developed. If
governments were to take these seriously again, such abuses would occur less
often. Also, when the benefits (protection of private property) and the costs
(invasion of private property) are denominated in a similar ‘unit’, it is
easier to find an objectively reasonable solutions than when the benefits (less
employer discrimination, less drug addicts, less ‘hateful’ publications, for instance) and the costs (invasion of
private property) are denominated in different ‘units’.
As a
general rule, the number of tenets of political morality should be kept to a
minimum. Unlike tenets of personal morality, it is a characteristic of tenets
of political morality that they be universal across a given society, as those
who do not follow these tenets are to be stopped or punished through
governmental physical coercion or the threat thereof. People have a wide range
of different tastes and preferences, and a moral tenet that seems perfectly
reasonable to one person might seem entirely unreasonable and oppressive to
another.
The
good thing about the tenet of respect for private property is that its aim is
to enable people, as much as possible, to best fulfill whatever ends that they
might choose to pursue. The fact that free-market prices are structured by
consumer demand and that producers are rewarded to the extent that they sell to
the consumers what they want is what enables everyone to pursue most of their
subjective ends more effectively in a free-market society based on private
property than in any other society. Virtually the only ends that the
free-market society demands that individuals renounce are those based on
aggressive violence and disrespect for the private property rights of others.
In fact, the free-market society even provides things like combative sporting
events and violent or ‘sneaky’ video games and movies to cater to those who see
some desirable aspects in violence or theft. All it asks is that people do not
actually, physically, attack their fellow citizens or steal or damage their
property. Some who would have been more suited to a ‘Viking’s’ life of murder
and plunder might be hurt by this, but for the vast majority there are only
benefits.
For
most other propositions that could be considered tenets of morality, the same
does not hold. They are often controversial and the benefits are far from as
clear as they are for the tenet of respect for private property. As a result,
when one group of people tries to impose them as tenets of political morality
on another group of people, violence can erupt or hatred can arise. In more
religious ages, brutal ‘Wars of Religion’ were the worst manifestations of this
phenomenon. In our more secular, democratic age, the primary manifestations are
intense, unproductive political polarization, particularly seen in the US, with
the ‘leftist’ proponents of ‘egalitarian’ tenets of political morality clashing
with the ‘rightist’ proponents of ‘conservative’ tenets of political morality.
Distracted by these seemingly irreconcilable clashes, many important political
issues are left unexamined and bad government continues along its merry way. If
it were just recognized that not all tenets of morality, no matter how firmly
you believe in them, should be enforced as tenets of political morality but can
profitably be left as tenets of personal morality, these negative effects would
have been, and can still be in the future, largely avoided.
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