‘Property is
Theft!’ shouts the socialist. ‘Taxation is Theft!’ shouts the libertarian. Who
is correct? Does ‘the community’, through the intermediation of the government,
own all the land within its borders? Or does the individual, either through
using their labor to make untouched land productive, or by purchasing land from
a previous owner, own the land?
A common socialist
response to the libertarian defense of the sanctity of private property is:
‘Don’t be so sure that you own this property that you speak of. The political
community is in fact the legitimate owner of all of the land within its
borders. Individuals just lease this land, and the taxes that they are assessed
for are the price of the rent. If you don’t like it, go move to another
country.’
The libertarian
rebuttal runs along these lines: ‘What legitimate claim does the political
community, or the government, have on all the land within its self-proclaimed
borders? It is the individual pioneers, those that have transformed the land
from useless wilderness into valuable economic asset, who have the only
legitimate claim to appropriate formerly un-owned land. When the government
demands tribute, it thus acts as a highwayman, not as a landowner.’
I think that both
of these arguments are on the wrong track. They are arguing about who ‘the
legitimate’ owner of a piece of land is. But the concept of ‘legitimacy’ only
makes sense within a framework of rules adopted to achieve a certain purpose.
If a boxer follows all of the rules of boxing during a match and ends up
knocking out his opponent, then he has achieved a ‘legitimate knockout’. If, on
the other hand, the boxer knocks out his opponent by kicking him in the head,
then his knockout is ‘illegitimate’, as it was not done according to the rules
of the sport. However, if the match was not a boxing match but a Mixed Martial
Arts (MMA) match, where kicking to the head is allowed by the rules, then the
same physical result would be considered a ‘legitimate knock-out’.
The point is that
the concept of legitimacy presupposes a framework of rules that a result or
arrangement are to be judged by. If the result or arrangement is in accordance
with the rules, it is legitimate, if not in accordance with the rules, it is
illegitimate. Thus, according to the socialist ‘rules’, the pretensions of
individual property owners are indeed illegitimate, while the governments’
commands and taxation levies are perfectly legitimate. However, according to
the libertarian ‘rules’, it is the pretensions of the government that are
illegitimate, while individuals may legitimately exercise full control over
their private property, so long as they don’t infringe on the legitimate
property rights of others.
Thus, the
fundamental question is: which rules should we recommend? Should we recommend
the libertarian rules, the socialist rules, or a set of rules that borrow
elements from each? The answer: whichever set of rules are in the best
interests of you and those that you care about. In what follows, I will
recommend the adoption of a set of property rules whose general adoption I
believe would be in the best interests of myself and of those that I care
about.
As a general
principle, private ownership of land by individuals is a very positive thing.
Generally, the more relevant a piece of land is to the welfare of an
individual, the more pains they will take to maintain the land, improve the
land, and direct the land (through sale, use, or lease) to its most value-productive
uses. Masses of overwhelmed, under informed, and apathetic democratic electors,
or government officials who receive the bulk of their income from general
taxation rather than from the specific parcels of land that they are
administering, will have less of an incentive to care about a particular
parcel of land than most private owners would.
Still, we need not
push this principle to the point of delegitimizing every political arrangement
besides anarchism, as many libertarians do. If a minimal role for government,
particularly in the spheres of law and protection against aggressors, is
considered a positive thing (as I consider it), then we can always devise the
property rules in such a way as to make some limited government actions
‘legitimate’. We could say that the government has a limited lien on all landed
property within its political borders, a lien that allows it to protect people
against physical and fraudulent aggression on those lands and to levy enough in
taxation from those who live on these lands to fund this protection.
Then comes the
question of what to do with previously untouched land. The libertarian
principle involves allocating ownership of the land to those people who first
work the land and make it productive, who ‘mix their labor with the land’, as
John Locke would say. This allows untouched land to be transformed into the
private property of those who have a significant economic stake in the land,
which, as explained above, is generally a positive thing.
While a relatively
simple general principle, it becomes more complicated when we start thinking
about details and specific cases. How much ‘labor’ would people have to ‘mix’
in order to claim a certain amount of land as their private property? Could a single
rancher claim ownership of a vast field of grass if they just built a wooden
fence around a large territory? Also, sometimes, especially in the modern
world, undeveloped land is valuable. Logging companies love virgin forests, but
would cutting a few trees give them a property claim to parts of the forest? And
how about wilderness sanctuaries or wild animal reserves? These can be valuable
land assets, but the ‘mixing labor’ property allocation rule would seem to be
arbitrarily biased against them.
The other option
is to give full land ownership rights to untouched land to the government with
military power/responsibility over the territory in question. They would not be
allowed to develop the land themselves or to sell the untouched land with
strings attached, only to sell it to others as full private property. But
again, we are faced with the problem of giving land ownership responsibility to
a giant organization whose decision-makers don’t have much of a personal
economic stake in the land at all. One way to deal with this problem would be
to specify that the government’s untouched land must be sold, in a gradual
fashion, to the highest bidders in a fully public auction, open to all comers.
Then, the land would be allocated to those who were willing to put up the
biggest economic stake in it (the highest bidder), which would ensure that the
land would become private property in the hands of individuals economically
interested in the land. The winners of the auctions could either be prospective
personal users of the land, prospective landlords of the land, or they could be
land speculators that would try to flip the land for a profit. Either way, the
owner would be personally interested in allocating the land to or using the
land for its most value-productive purposes, and this could include activities
such as ranching, logging, wildlife and wilderness preservation, activities
which the ‘labor mixing’ principle might be biased against. In addition, with
this method, the government could use the land auction proceeds, however
limited they might end up being, to partially fund their activities for a
while, thus giving a break to taxpayers.
The main problem
with this auction solution is that the land would go to those who already
possessed economic means, rather than to those poor pioneers who sought to use
their labor and perseverance to carve out property for themselves. From the
perspective of social mobility and economic egalitarianism, this is a mark
against it and in favor of the ‘mixing labor’ principle.
Also, unlike all
other economic goods, ground land can actually serve as the basis of a real
monopoly. Other economic goods cannot be monopolized because either one party
cannot own them en masse (human labor where slavery is prohibited), or they can
be produced by newcomers with enough money at their disposal, so long as the
necessary land factors aren’t monopolized. Thus, there cannot be a real steel
monopoly, even if one firm had 100% market share in the steel industry, unless
the firm had a full monopoly of all iron sites in the world. A newcomer with
brains and money (his own or borrowed) could start his own steel operation by
buying iron, tools and machines, and the necessary labor, and then getting to
work. This would not be possible if the 100% market share steel company owned
all of the iron sites in the world, because then the company could just refuse
to sell its iron to anyone who sought to make steel with it, and prevent anyone
from challenging its 100% market share.
Now, a real land
monopoly like this is pretty unlikely, except perhaps in a few industries such
as the diamond industry. Nevertheless, spreading initially un-owned land
amongst a variety of individual owners would make a land monopoly even more
unlikely. This the ‘labor mixing’ principle would achieve more effectively than
the public auction method, which would probably end up concentrating un-owned
land in fewer hands, at least initially.
In any case, I
think that one of these methods, or some kind of combination of the two, should
be adopted when it comes to allocating ownership rights to untouched land. As
long as the government doesn’t hold the land for excessive periods of time or
try to develop the land itself, I would be satisfied.
Once we have
settled on a set of general property rules based on considerations of long-run
expediency, we can then call specific instances of property ownership
‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ by judging it according to our rules. We don’t
have to bother about what adherents of different sets of rules think is
‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ property, unless they can convince us that their
rules are a more expedient set of rules than our own.
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