Murray Rothbard was a great
economist, historian, political thinker, political activist, and thinker/writer
in general. Reading Rothbard’s work fundamentally changed my perspective on the
world, almost as much as reading Ludwig von Mises’ work did. Despite this, I
think that one aspect of his intellectual legacy was negative rather than
positive. This was his position that an objective, universalistic,
rationally-determinable ‘natural law’, binding on all of mankind, existed and
should provide the philosophical basis for social thought (instead of
utilitarianism).
In order to properly criticize this
position, I wrote this passage-based critique of The Ethics Of Liberty[1],
the book in which Rothbard laid out his position most systematically. I have focused
my attention on the foundational chapters, as well as on the chapter in which
Rothbard criticizes Ludwig von Mises’ utilitarianism.
Chapter 2: Natural Law As “Science”
Rothbard: “Professor Hesselberg has shown, however,
that Hume, in the course of his own discussions, was compelled to reintroduce a
natural-law conception into his social philosophy and particularly into his
theory of justice, thus illustrating the gibe of Etienne Gilson: “The natural law
always buries its undertakers.” For Hume, in Hesselberg's words, “recognized
and accepted that the social . . . order is an indispensable prerequisite to
man's well-being and happiness: and that this is a statement of fact.” The
social order, therefore, must be maintained by man.”
Brian: No, the social order is only an
indispensable prerequisite to a man’s well-being
and happiness if that man values
everything that the social order can get for him, including vastly increased
material wealth, the opportunity to specialize in a specific profession, and
companionship, more than what he must give up in order to secure those benefits
(ie. he must refrain from arbitrarily killing, assaulting, or robbing others). We
can say that if the man wants the
benefits, he must maintain the social
order. But without the if statement,
there is really no must about it.
Chapter 3: Natural Law Versus Positive Law
Rothbard: “At this point, we need only stress that the
very existence of a natural law discoverable by reason is a potentially
powerful threat to the status quo and a standing reproach to the reign of
blindly traditional custom or the arbitrary will of the State apparatus.”
Brian: Replace “a natural law” by “a utilitarian
science of human society” and the rest of the sentence still holds. Natural law
is not at all necessary to criticize State orders or traditions, utilitarianism
can serve this function equally well.
Chapter 6: A Crusoe Social Philosophy
Rothbard: “Crusoe,
we have said, learns about his ends and about how to attain them. But what
specifically does his learning faculty, his reason, do in the process of
obtaining such knowledge? It learns about the way things work in the world,
i.e., the natures of the various specific entities and
classes of entities that the man finds in existence; in short, he learns the natural laws of the way things behave in the world.
He learns that an arrow shot from a bow can bring down a deer, and that a net
can catch an abundance of fish. Further, he learns about his own nature, about the sort of events and
actions that will make him happy or unhappy; in short, he learns about the ends
he needs to achieve and those he should seek to avoid.”
Brian: We have two very different kinds of learning
here. The first is learning “the natural laws of the way things behave in the
world”, in Rothbard’s words. Inanimate objects such as nets and bows have
constant properties that can be discovered by man’s reason. Even animals,
because mainly guided by instincts, have relatively constant properties that
can be discovered by man’s reason. The second is learning “about his own
nature, about the sort of events and actions that will make him happy or
unhappy”, in Rothbard’s words. This Crusoe and anyone else can surely do, but
the all-important question is: once he discovers his own nature, has he also discovered something about man’s nature? I submit that he has not,
because men are almost infinitely variable and differ so dramatically in tastes
and conduct. What Crusoe learns about himself will not necessarily be
applicable to other men, in contrast to what Crusoe learns about stones which
will generally be applicable to other, similar stones as well.
Rothbard: “The individual man, in introspecting the
fact of his own consciousness, also discovers the primordial natural fact of
his freedom: his freedom to choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason
about any given subject. In short, the natural fact of his “free will.” He also
discovers the natural fact of his mind’s command over his body and its actions:
that is, of his natural ownership over his self.”
Brian: Yes, these two things are natural facts, an
individual man’s brain is in control of his actions and of his body. While
true, these facts do not serve as the foundation for any kind of normative
natural law theory, just as the fact that most men have ten fingers and ten
toes at birth does not.
Rothbard: “Suppose now that Crusoe is confronted with
a choice of either picking berries or picking some mushrooms for food, and he
decides upon the pleasantly tasting mushrooms, when suddenly a previously
shipwrecked inhabitant, coming upon Crusoe, shouts: “Don’t do that! Those
mushrooms are poisonous.” There is no mystery in Crusoe’s subsequent shift to
berries. What has happened here? Both men have operated on an assumption so
strong that it remained tacit, an assumption that poison is bad, bad for the
health and even for the survival of the human organism—in short, bad for the
continuation and the quality of a man’s life. In this implicit agreement on the
value of life and health for the person, and on the evils of pain and death,
the two men have clearly arrived at the basis of an ethic, grounded on reality
and on the natural laws of the human organism.”
Brian: Two men can certainly agree on a lot of
things, from the great value of life, as they do in this example, to the
judgement that Mozart is the greatest musical composer of all time. But even if
two men, or even two billion men, agree on something, it does not necessarily
mean that all men who have ever lived or
ever will live will so agree. And yet this is what the concept of a
universal, natural law ethic implies. The existence of even one suicidal person
in the world breaks the consensus that life is preferable to death. The
consensus that life is preferable to death will remain extremely broad, but one
does not need an “ethic” to pursue this preference. What’s wrong with just
saying that most people will prefer life over death, and hence most people will
try to adopt means that are suitable for attaining the end of preserving their
lives? Why bring “ethics” into the discussion?
Rothbard: “If Crusoe had eaten the mushrooms without
learning of their poisonous effects, then his decision would have been incorrect—a
possibly tragic error based on the fact that man is scarcely automatically
determined to make correct decisions at all times. Hence, his lack of
omniscience and his liability to error. If Crusoe, on the other hand, had known
of the poison and eaten the mushrooms anyway—perhaps for “kicks” or from a very
high time preference—then his decision would have been objectively immoral, an act
deliberately set against his life and health. It may well be asked why life should be an objective ultimate value, why
man should opt for life (in duration and quality). In reply, we may note that a
proposition rises to the status of an axiom when he who denies it may be shown to
be using it in the very course of the supposed refutation. Now, any person participating in any sort of
discussion, including one on values, is, by virtue of so participating, alive
and affirming life. For if he were really opposed to life, he would have no
business in such a discussion, indeed he would have no business continuing to
be alive. Hence, the supposed opponent of life is really affirming
it in the very process of his discussion, and hence the preservation and
furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.”
Brian: If we assume that the Crusoe in the first
scenario is not suicidal, then I have no problem calling his decision
‘incorrect’. He valued the end of preserving his life, but unwittingly adopted
means that were not conducive to this end. He would have been better off if he
were better informed. In the second scenario though, I cannot acquiesce in
calling Crusoe’s decision ‘immoral’. Crusoe knew what the results of his action
would be and decided to carry out the action, thus demonstrating that he
preferred carrying out the action over not carrying out the action.
I am
unimpressed by the so-called ‘axiom’ that Rothbard argues in favour of. If in
the process of enjoying some vanilla ice cream, I stated that not everyone
enjoys vanilla ice cream, I would not be contradicting myself. I am only
demonstrating that I enjoy vanilla
ice cream with my actions, not that everyone
enjoys vanilla ice cream. It is the same thing with the preference for life
over death. My continued existence does demonstrate that, at this moment, I
prefer life to death. It by no means demonstrates that all men who have ever lived or ever will live always preferred/will
prefer life to death at all times. I can, without contradiction, demonstrate
that I value life over death with my actions, while at the same time arguing
that other people might value death
over life. One doesn’t have to be an “opponent of life” to argue that the
preference for life over death is not a universally held preference among all
mankind.
Finally,
Rothbard says that life in terms of “duration and quality” is an “objective
ultimate value”. But what if a man must choose between a longer duration of
life and a greater quality of life, which most people will be in a position to
do at least once in their lives? I will leave it to the believers in ‘natural
law’ to resolve this paradox without reference to the subjective valuations of
individuals. I believe that they will find it to be an impossible task.
Chapter 7: Interpersonal Relations: Voluntary Exchange
Rothbard: “A vital point: if we are trying to set up
an ethic for man (in our case, the subset of ethics dealing with violence),
then to be a valid ethic the theory must hold true for all men, whatever their location in time
or place. This is one of the
notable attributes of natural law—its applicability to all men, regardless of
time or place. Thus, ethical natural law takes its place alongside physical or “scientific”
natural laws. But the society of liberty is the only society that can apply the same basic
rule to every man, regardless of time or place. Here is one of the ways in
which reason can select one theory of natural law over a rival theory—just as
reason can choose between many economic or other competing theories. Thus, if
someone claims that the Hohenzollern or Bourbon families have the “natural
right” to rule everyone else, this kind of doctrine is easily refutable by
simply pointing to the fact that there is here no uniform ethic for every
person: one’s rank in the ethical order being dependent on the accident of
being, or not being, a Hohenzollern. Similarly, if someone says that every man
has a “natural right” to three square meals a day, it is glaringly obvious that
this is a fallacious natural law or natural rights theory; for there are
innumerable times and places where it is physically impossible to provide three
square meals for all, or even for the majority, of the population. Hence this cannot
be set forth as some kind of “natural right.” On the other hand, consider the
universal status of the ethic of liberty, and of the natural right of person
and property that obtains under such an ethic. For every person, at any time or
place, can be covered by the basic rules: ownership of one’s own self,
ownership of the previously unused resources which one has occupied and
transformed; and ownership of all titles derived from that basic
ownership—either through voluntary exchanges or voluntary gifts. These
rules—which we might call the “rules of natural ownership”—can clearly be
applied, and such ownership defended, regardless of the time or place, and
regardless of the economic attainments of the society. It is impossible for any
other social system to qualify as universal natural law; for if there is any
coercive rule by one person or group over another
(and all rule partakes of such hegemony), then
it is impossible to apply the same rule for all; only a rulerless, purely
libertarian world can fulfill the qualifications of natural rights and natural
law, or, more important, can fulfill the conditions of a universal ethic for
all mankind.”
Brian: I agree that if we desire to elaborate and set up a universal natural law ethic
for all of mankind as the basic law of our society, than a libertarian one is
the only one that really qualifies. But this is actually a big if: what if a non-universal set of
societal rules actually turns out to be better for the general well-being of
mankind than the universal set? Why is universality of the rules necessarily
the overriding consideration? Rothbard does not really justify his position,
besides by saying that physical laws are universal and thus natural societal
laws should be too. This is not really an argument at all though; it is just a
striving to make unlike things (physical laws and ‘ethical natural laws’) more
similar.
Chapter 8: Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression
Rothbard: “Let us set
aside for a moment the corollary but more complex case of tangible property,
and concentrate on the question of a man’s ownership rights to his own body.
Here there are two alternatives: either we may lay down a rule that each man
should be permitted (i.e., have the right to) the full ownership of his own
body, or we may rule that he may not have such complete ownership. If he does, then we have
the libertarian natural law for a free society as treated above. But if he does not, if each man is not entitled to full and 100 percent
self-ownership, then what does this imply? It implies either one of two
conditions: (1) the “communist” one of Universal and Equal Other-ownership, or
(2) Partial Ownership of One Group by Another—a system of rule by one class
over another. These are the only logical alternatives to a state of 100 percent
self-ownership for all.
Let us consider alternative (2); here, one person or group of persons, G, are entitled to own not only themselves but also the remainder of society, R. But, apart from many other problems and difficulties with this kind of system, we cannot here have a universal or natural-law ethic for the human race. We can only have a partial and arbitrary ethic, similar to the view that Hohenzollerns are by nature entitled to rule over non-Hohenzollerns. Indeed, the ethic which states that Class G is entitled to rule over Class R implies that the latter, R, are subhuman beings who do not have a right to participate as full humans in the rights of self-ownership enjoyed by G—but this of course violates the initial assumption that we are carving out an ethic for human beings as such.
What then of alternative (I)? This is the view that, considering individuals A, B, C . . ., no man is entitled to 100 percent ownership of his own person. Instead, an equal part of the ownership of A’s body should be vested in B, C . . ., and the same should hold true for each of the others. This view, at least, does have the merit of being a universal rule, applying to every person in the society, but it suffers from numerous other difficulties.
In the first place, in practice, if there are more than a very few people in the society, this alternative must break down and reduce to Alternative (2), partial rule by some over others. For it is physically impossible for everyone to keep continual tabs on everyone else, and thereby to exercise his equal share of partial ownership over every other man. In practice, then, this concept of universal and equal other-ownership is Utopian and impossible, and supervision and therefore ownership of others necessarily becomes a specialized activity of a ruling class. Hence, no society which does not have full self-ownership for everyone can enjoy a universal ethic. For this reason alone, 100percent self-ownership for every man is the only viable political ethic for mankind.
But suppose for the sake of argument that this Utopia could be sustained. What then? In the first place, it is surely absurd to hold that no man is entitled to own himself, and yet to hold that each of these very men is entitled to own a part of all other men! But more than that, would our Utopia be desirable? Can we picture a world in which no man is free to take any action whatsoever without prior approval by everyone else in society? Clearly no man would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish. But if a world of zero or near-zero self-ownership spells death for the human race, then any steps in that direction also contravene the law of what is best for man and his life on earth. And, as we saw above, any ethic where one group is given full ownership of another violates the most elemental rule for any ethic: that it apply to every man. No partial ethics are any better, though they may seem superficially more plausible, than the theory of all- power-to-the-Hohenzollerns.
In contrast, the society of absolute self-ownership for all rests on the primordial fact of natural self-ownership by every man, and on the fact that each man may only live and prosper as he exercises his natural freedom of choice, adopts values, learns how to achieve them, etc. By virtue of being a man, he must use his mind to adopt ends and means; if someone aggresses against him to change his freely-selected course, this violates his nature; it violates the way he must function. In short, an aggressor interposes violence to thwart the natural course of a man’s freely adopted ideas and values, and to thwart his actions based upon such values.”
Brian: This section is actually one of the most
important sections of the book, and with it, I think, the general argument either
succeeds or fails. As we discussed above, it assumes that we have to be looking
for a universal ethic that applies equally to all of mankind. It is through
this assumption that Rothbard disposes of any kind of elitist arrangement. As I
explained above, if we do not particularly care about this assumption holding
though, the argument is to no effect.
Rothbard
then tries to dispose of all egalitarian arrangements by pointing out the gross
impracticality of “Universal and Equal Other-ownership”. He writes: “But if a
world of zero or near-zero self-ownership spells death for the human race, then
any steps in that direction also contravene the law of what is best for man and
his life on earth.” Here, Rothbard relies on another crucial assumption underlying
his thinking, an assumption that I think is untenable. He assumes that we must
ultimately settle on an absolutist ‘ethic’ of some kind. If one absolutist
ethic can be shown to be generally good (absolute freedom and self-ownership),
while another absolutist ethic can be shown to be horribly bad (complete
egalitarianism), Rothbard assumes that anything in between the absolutist ethic
of freedom and the absolutist ethic of egalitarianism will, because it is
closer to the absolutist ethic of egalitarianism, necessarily be worse than
just following the absolutist ethic of freedom.
But
isn’t it at least conceivable that a non-absolutist arrangement could work
better than both absolutist positions? When I, and other libertarian writers on
economic and political affairs (including Rothbard himself), seek to argue
against egalitarian policies, we don’t just state that since absolute
egalitarianism is clearly ridiculous, any policy that contains any egalitarian
elements must also be ridiculous. I suspect that we would be justly laughed at
if we constantly employed this stratagem. Rather, we analyze and evaluate each social
issue systematically, and generally argue that in most cases, freedom will work
better than coercion (in either its egalitarian or elitist forms).
It
is true that other libertarians and I also argue that since freedom works
better as a general societal rule than elitist or egalitarian coercion, freedom
should be allowed to operate even in isolated cases when coercion might produce
a better result. Otherwise, a bad precedent might be set and the spreading use
of coercion due to the precedent might end up causing more pain in general and
in the long-run than it produced benefit in the isolated case. But while the
costs of setting bad precedents and of compromising good general rules are
significant and definitely worth considering carefully, it would be extravagant
to say that these costs always override any benefits that might be obtained
through the bad precedent-setting actions. There are no shortcuts to
intelligent social policy analysis, and I think that Rothbard tries adopting
one here.
Rothbard: “Now the man who seizes another’s property
is living in basic contradiction to his own nature as a man. For we have seen
that man can only live and prosper by his own production
and exchange of products. The aggressor, on the other hand, is not a producer
at all but a predator; he lives parasitically off the labor and product of others.
Hence, instead of living in accordance with the nature of man, the aggressor is
a parasite who feeds unilaterally by exploiting the labor and energy of other
men. Here is clearly a complete violation of any kind of universal ethic, for
man clearly cannot live as a parasite; parasites must have non-parasites, producers,
to feed upon. The parasite not only fails to add to the social total of goods
and services, he depends completely on the production of the host body. And
yet, any increase in coercive parasitism decreases ipso facto the quantity and the output of the producers,
until finally, if the producers die out, the parasites will quickly follow
suit.”
Brian: Again, the assumption that we need to find a
universal ethic at all costs, which I think is not a justified assumption.
Also, the argument assumes that every man has the same basic ‘nature’ as each
another. What if some men, naturally, greatly enjoy being predators and despise
engaging in production of any kind (Vikings for instance)? The fact that if
everyone in the world became a predator the human race would die out is a good
fact for would-be predators to be cognisant of, but there are means that
predators can employ to avoid this eventuality. The most common technique is
for predators to establish a monopoly of coercive force (or of predation) in a
particular geographical area. They then use a combination of their superior
force and of intellectual propaganda techniques in order to maintain their
coercive, monopolistic rule. They are predators, but they use a great deal of
their power to ensure that others don’t become predators in their geographical
regions.
The result of the widespread use of this technique covered the earth in monopolistic ‘States’ long before the theory that governments should only exist by consent of the governed and should serve the interests of the governed became popular. This monopolistic State-system, while less than ideal from a social policy stand-point, certainly does not represent Rothbard’s nightmare scenario where everyone gives up production and becomes a predator. In this case, lucky predators can enrich themselves through their favored means as long as the prey doesn’t put up too much of a fuss. If a philosopher were to tell these predators that what they are doing does not accord with their natures as human beings, it is unlikely that they would be too bothered. Only the prey resisting the predators defensively in an organized fashion would ultimately serve to check their anti-social actions.
Chapter 26: Utilitarian Free-Market Economics: C. Ludwig von Mises and
“Value-Free” Laissez-Faire
Mises: “An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is
recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g, an effect which
even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If the economist
states the outcome of his investigation by saying that a is a bad measure, he does not
pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of
those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate.”
Rothbard: “Now this is surely an ingenious attempt to
allow pronouncements of “good” or “bad” by the economist without making a value
judgment; for the economist is supposed to be only a praxeologist, a
technician, pointing out to his readers or listeners that they will all consider a policy “bad” once
he reveals its full consequences. But ingenious as it is, the attempt
completely fails. For how does Mises know what the advocates of the particular
policy consider desirable? How does he know what their value-scales are now or what
they will be when the consequences of the measure appear? One of the great
contributions of praxeologic economics is that the economist realizes that he
doesn’t know what anyone’s value scales are except
as those value preferences are demonstrated by a person’s concrete action.”
Brian: I think that this criticism of Mises is
unfair. Mises says that the economist “merely says that from the point of view
of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a
is inappropriate”. Mises doesn’t say that he definitely knows that all of
humanity will necessarily be aiming at the goal p, he just says that if they
are, they will consider the policy a bad one. Mises makes it clear elsewhere in
his writings that the findings of free-market economics are mostly useless from
the point of view of total aesthetics or psychopathic murderers who don’t care
about material well-being. The fact is though that the vast majority of
humanity are neither of these things, and hence in most cases the evaluations
of policies as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ by the free-market economist, if the listeners
believe him when he describes the consequences of the policy, will generally be
shared, at least in general terms, by the vast majority of the listeners.
Rothbard: “Moreover,
there is another fundamental reason for advocates of “inappropriate” policies
to refuse to change their minds even after hearing and acknowledging the
praxeological (economic) chain of consequences. For praxeology may indeed show
that all types of government policies will have consequences that most people, at least, will tend to abhor;
however, (and this is a vital qualification) most of these consequences take time, some a great
deal of time. No economist has done more than Ludwig von Mises to elucidate the
universality of time-preference in human affairs—the praxeologic law
that everyone prefers to attain a given satisfaction sooner than later. And certainly, Mises, as a
value-free scientist, could never presume to criticize anyone’s rate of time preference, to say that A’s
was “too high” or B’s “too low.” But, in that case, what about the
high-time-preference people in society who may retort to the praxeologist:
“perhaps this high tax and subsidy policy will lead to a decline of capital;
perhaps even the price control will lead to shortages, but I don’t care. Having
a high time-preference, I value more highly the short-run subsidies, or the
short-run enjoyment of buying the current good at cheaper prices, than the
prospect of suffering the future consequences.” And Mises, as a value-free
scientist and opponent of any concept of objective ethics, cannot call them wrong. There is no way that
he can assert the superiority of the long-run over the short-run without
overriding the values of the high time-preference people; and this cannot be
cogently done without abandoning his own subjectivist ethics.”
Brian: Yes, the findings of free-market economics
will be more important to people with lower time-preferences than to people
with higher time-preferences, granted.
Mises: “Liberalism [i.e., laissez-faire liberalism]
is a political doctrine. . . . As a political doctrine liberalism (in contrast
to economic science) is not neutral with regard to values and ultimate ends
sought by action. It assumes that all men or at least the majority of people
are intent upon attaining certain goals. It gives them information about the
means suitable to the realization of their plans. The champions of liberal
doctrines are fully aware of the fact that their teachings are valid only for
people who are committed to their valuational principles. While praxeology, and
therefore economics too, uses the terms happiness and removal of uneasiness in
a purely formal sense, liberalism attaches to them a concrete meaning. It presupposes
that people prefer life to death, health to sickness . . . abundance to
poverty. It teaches men how to act in accordance with these valuations.”
Rothbard: “In this
second variant, Mises has successfully escaped the self-contradiction of being
a value-free praxeologist advocating laissez faire. Granting in this variant
that the economist may not make such advocacy, he takes his stand as a
“citizen” willing to make value judgments. But he is not willing to simply
assert an ad hoc value judgment; presumably he feels
that a valuing intellectual must present some sort of ethical system to justify such
value judgments. But, as a utilitarian, Mises’s system is a curiously bloodless
one; even as a valuing laissez-faire liberal, he is only willing to make the one value judgment that he joins the
majority of the people in favoring their common peace, prosperity, and
abundance. In this way as an opponent of objective ethics, and uncomfortable as
he must be with making any value judgments even as a citizen, he makes the
minimal possible degree of such judgments. True to his utilitarian position,
his value judgment is the desirability of fulfilling the subjectively desired
goals of the bulk of the populace.
A few points in critique of this position may here be made. In the first place, while praxeology can indeed demonstrate that laissez faire will lead to harmony, prosperity, and abundance, whereas government intervention leads to conflict and impoverishment, and while it is probably true that most people value the former highly, it is not true that these are their only goals or values. The great analyst of ranked value scales and diminishing marginal utility should have been more aware of such competing values and goals. For example, many people, whether through envy or a misplaced theory of justice, may prefer far more equality of income than will be attained on the free market. Many people, pace the aforementioned intellectuals, may want less abundance in order to whittle down our allegedly “excessive” affluence. Others, as we have mentioned above, may prefer to loot the capital of the rich or the businessman in the short-run, while acknowledging but dismissing the long-run ill effects, because they have a high time-preference. Probably very few of these people will want to push statist measures to the point of total impoverishment and destruction—although this may well happen. But a majority coalition of the above might well opt for some reduction in wealth and prosperity on behalf of these other values. They may well decide that it is worth sacrificing a modicum of wealth and efficient production because of the high opportunity cost of not being able to enjoy an alleviation of envy, or a lust for power or submission to power, or, for example, the thrill of “national unity” which they might enjoy from a (short-lived) economic crisis.
What can Mises reply to a majority of the public who have indeed considered all the praxeological consequences, and still prefer a modicum–or, for that matter, even a drastic amount—of statism in order to achieve some of their competing goals? As a utilitarian, he cannot quarrel with the ethical nature of their chosen goals, for, as a utilitarian, he must confine himself to the one value judgment that he favors the majority achieving their chosen goals. The only reply that Mises can make within his own framework is to point out that government intervention has a cumulative effect, that eventually the economy must move either toward the free market or toward full socialism, which praxeology shows will bring chaos and drastic impoverishment, at least to an industrial society. But this, too, is not a fully satisfactory answer. While many or most programs of statist intervention—especially price controls—are indeed cumulative, others are not. Furthermore, the cumulative impact takes such a long time that the time-preferences of the majority might well lead them, in full acknowledgment of the consequences, to ignore the effect. And then what?”
Brian: I think
that Rothbard misunderstands Mises’ position here. Rothbard says that: “True to
his (Mises’) utilitarian position, his value judgment is the desirability of
fulfilling the subjectively desired goals of the bulk of the populace.” But if
you look back at what Mises actually wrote, he said: “While praxeology, and
therefore economics too, uses the terms happiness and removal of uneasiness in
a purely formal sense, liberalism attaches to them a concrete meaning. It
presupposes that people prefer life to death, health to sickness . . .
abundance to poverty. It teaches men how to act in accordance with these
valuations.” Preferring life to death, health to sickness, and abundance to
poverty are real value judgements that liberalism assumes in its adherents.
Mises clearly recognizes that if someone prefers poverty to abundance or
sickness to health, (free-market) liberalism will not appeal to him.
The appealing thing about liberalism is that the
free-market which it enables can cater to a wide array of different tastes. The
only thing which market participants really have to agree on is to prefer
abundance to poverty and to prefer the extra abundance that society enables more
than the ability to violently assault and rob people which they must give up.
Liberalism does not require unanimity from its adherents in terms of religion,
lifestyle choices, ice cream flavour preferences, or a wide array of other
things, and this is one of its great virtues as a political ideology.
It is
true, as Rothbard points out, that even if people agree on their fundamental
valuations, their more detailed subjective valuations could in some cases lead
them to want to deviate from absolutist libertarianism in certain cases.
Firstly though, Mises wasn’t in fact an absolutist libertarian; he was a
minarchist (supporter of strictly limited government) who might even have
supported a limited scope for government welfare programs and public education,
though his writings are unclear on these points. Thus, the fact that his
version of liberalism wouldn’t necessarily lead everyone to advocate absolutist
libertarianism wouldn’t bother him too much.
Secondly,
and more fundamentally, Rothbard fails to recognize that there are two
complementary varieties of utilitarianism: egoistic utilitarianism (what the
thinker believes will work best for him personally) and universalistic
utilitarianism (what the thinker believes will work best for mankind as a
whole). When engaged in intellectual discourse about social arrangements,
utilitarians typically speak in terms of universalistic utilitarianism in order
to persuade and to appeal to as broad an audience as possible. At the end of
the day though, people will decide whether to support a particular social
policy or political ideology based on their particular, egoistic utilitarian
position. Mises points out how broadly beneficial his variant of liberalism is
in order to persuade others to support it, but ultimately his advocacy of this
position is based on his own egoistic utilitarian calculations. Mises,
personally, thinks that his variant of liberalism is the best general way for
organizing society, from his own subjective, egoistic point of view. People who
value egalitarianism more than him or value material affluence less than him
may support illiberal social policies, even if they are fully aware of their
consequences, as Rothbard points out. But then to Mises and to those who think
like him, these people are just enemies, enemies to be hopefully overruled (and
overpowered if necessary) by the majority of citizens who agree with Mises.
Now,
Rothbard could try to respond by saying that this isn’t good enough, that
advocacy of social policies shouldn’t just be based on subjective, egoistic
whim. But it isn’t a question of good enough or not: that’s just the way it is.
People will ultimately see the world through their subjective, egoistic points
of view and will act accordingly. There is no objective natural law which can
mysteriously induce people to conform to one another in terms of their
fundamental valuations, however much Rothbard may wish there to be. I think
that I have sufficiently demonstrated in this critique how Rothbard’s endeavour
to formulate such an objective natural law fails.
No comments:
Post a Comment