Libertarian Anarchism:
Responses to Ten Objections[1]
Objection 4: Private
Protection Agencies Will Battle
Long: “Which is likelier to settle its
disputes through violence: a government or a private protection agency? Well,
the difference is that private protection agencies have to bear the costs of
their own decisions to go to war. Going to war is expensive. If you have a
choice between two protection agencies, and one solves its disputes through
violence most of the time, and the other one solves its disputes through
arbitration most of the time – now, you might think, “I want the one that
solves its disputes through violence – that sounds really cool!” But then you
look at your monthly premiums. And you think, well, how committed are you to
this Viking mentality? Now, you might be so committed to the Viking mentality
that you’re willing to pay for it; but still, it is more expensive. A lot of
customers are going to say, “I want to go to one that doesn’t charge all this
extra amount for the violence.” Whereas, governments – first of all, they’ve
got captive customers, they can’t go anywhere else – but since they’re taxing
the customers anyway, and so the customer don’t have the option to switch to a
different agency. And so, governments can externalize the costs of their going
to war much more effectively than private agencies can.” 9-10
Brian: Firstly, a private ‘protection
agency’ with a ‘Viking mentality’ would not confine itself to settling
disputes. It would seek to loot and plunder those who are not its allies. It is
true that war costs a lot, but the spoils of war, especially continuing levies
on a conquered population which a victorious war enables, can make those costs
worth it. The allies of a successful ‘Viking’ agency may well recoup more in
spoils than they must pay for the war effort.
Secondly, ‘customers’ living within the sphere of power of a ‘Viking’
agency would soon become ‘captive customers’, just as they are under
government. I can’t imagine that such an agency would stand idly by while its
former supporters or conquered population deserts it. It would use coercive
force to make sure that they continue paying ‘protection premiums’, which, for
all intents and purposes, are now the same as governmental taxes.
Long seems to assume what he is trying to prove: that every
private protection/dispute-resolution agency will remain just that, and not use
its coercive power to become something more sinister. I think that armed with
that kind of coercive power, these agencies would be sorely tempted to become
coercive, governmental, territorial monopolists. After a period of anarchy, I
think that territorial governments would eventually pop up again, but only
after a long period of bloody, disruptive, chaotic wars.
Objection #9: The
Masses Will Demand Bad Laws
Long: “If you live in California, you’ve
got enough people who are absolutely fanatical about banning smoking, or maybe
if you’re in Alabama, and it’s homosexuality instead of smoking they want to
ban (neither one would ban the other, I think) – in that case, it might happen
that they’re so fanatical about it that they would ban it. But remember that
they are going to have to be paying for this. So when you get your monthly
premium, you see: well, here’s your basic service – protecting you against
aggression; oh, and then here’s also your extended service, and the extra fee
for that – peering in your neighbors’ windows to make sure that they’re not – either
the tobacco or the homosexuality or whatever it is you’re worried about. Now
the really fanatical people will say, “Yes, I’m going to shell out the extra
money for this.” (Of course, if they’re that fanatical, they’re probably going
to be trouble under monarchy, too.) But if they’re not that fanatical, they’ll
say, “Well, if all I have to do is go into a voting booth and vote for these
laws restricting other people’s freedom, well, heck, I’d go in, it’s pretty
easy to go in and vote for it.” But if they actually have to pay for it – “Gee, I don’t know. Maybe I
can reconcile myself to this.” 14
Brian: Why can’t the ‘protection agency’
with the fanatical customers just fine the people that they catch breaking the
agency’s laws? Or confiscate their property? That way, the oppressed people
would be paying for their own oppression, as often happens under governmental
systems. This strategy would make the cost to the fanatics less.
Also, many people genuinely believe that various restrictions
on other people’s freedom are greatly beneficial to their society and community
as a whole. These people would view paying for a more intrusive ‘protection
agency’ as a good investment. It wouldn’t just be crazy fanatics who would be
willing to pay for a more intrusive ‘protection agency’.
Finally, as I discussed above, if a ‘protection agency’ were
to start getting into the business of restricting unwilling people’s freedom,
they would probably have few scruples about captivating their ‘customers’ and
forcing them to continue paying for the ‘protection’, regardless of the cost.
Question #4: What will
prevent protection companies from becoming a protection racket?
Long: “Well, other protection companies.
If it succeeds in doing it, then it’s become a government. But during the time
it’s trying to do it, it hasn’t yet become a government, so we assume there are
still other agencies around, and it’s in those other agencies’ interest to make
sure that this doesn’t happen. Could it become a protection racket? In
principle. Could protection agencies evolve into government? Some could. I
think probably historically some have. But the question is: is that a likely or
inevitable result? I don’t think so because there is a check-and-balance
against it. Checks-and-balances can fail in anarchy just like they can fail
under constitutions. But there is a check-and-balance against it which is the
possibility of calling in other protection agencies or someone starting another
protection agency before this thing has yet had a chance to acquire that kind
of power.” 18
Brian: Let’s run through a scenario: A
protection agency gets a substantial market share in a geographical region due
to high quality of service. Let us call them the Bourbon Company. It then
decides to become a protection racket, a monopolistic government. To do so, it
must use coercive force to turn their substantial regional market share into a
100% regional ‘market share’, by forcing those who hadn’t been customers before
to pay them. Seeing this, the non-customers in the region, and a number of
customers who aren’t keen on being under monopoly rule, decide to call in other
protection agencies to defend them, most likely agencies with their main bases
of operation in other geographical regions.
The Bourbon Company, having gone rogue, levies tribute for
their war effort from every person within their area of power. The people
opposing the Bourbon Company in the region must band together and hire other
protection agencies, probably from abroad, to defend their freedom. These
protection agencies are not going to finance a costly war out of their own pockets:
the people threatened by the Bourbon Company must have enough money to pay
these other agencies, in order to make fighting a war on these people’s behalf profitable
for those agencies. In order to stand a chance, the anti-Bourbon coalition
would need to include a significant number of rich and influential people from
the threatened region, to persuade people to support their cause and to be able
to pay the other protection agencies for help.
Here’s the problem though: what if the Bourbon Company
promises special political privileges to the rich and influential people in the
threatened geographical region in order to secure their support? What if they also
co-opt the influential intellectuals and demagogues of the region, whom they could
use to persuade the masses to support their coup? If they did these things,
then the anti-Bourbon coalition would be sapped of the kind of support that it
would need to stand a chance against the Bourbon Company. Outside protection
agencies would view getting involved in such a conflict as dangerous and overly
costly, with negligible chances of profit. The Bourbon Company would take over
the region, and become a monopolistic government. Historically, I think that
most newly-formed governments got their start in this or in a similar way,
especially the part about co-opting rich and influential people and
intellectuals.
If my analysis is correct, than establishing anarchy would be
a losing proposition overall. Whatever short-term gains for freedom that might
come out of an initially anarchic arrangement would be trumped by the chaos and
destruction that the struggles of the protection agencies to become
monopolistic governments would bring in their wake. Better to make do with the
current governments and try to reform them through popular pressure, than go
through that kind of chaos and get the same thing (monopolistic governments) back
soon anyway.
[1] Roderick
T. Long, “Libertarian Anarchism: Responses to Ten Objections”, transcription of
an informal talk at the Mises Institute, given during the Mises University,
August 6, 2004.
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