(Note: I recommend that you read my previous post, ‘Reconciling
Natural Law and Utilitarianism’, before reading this one.)
The relationship between morality and individual utility is a
complicated one. First, we will lay out our conclusions, and then go on to
explain them:
1. At its root, any good moral code must be based on some
kind of utilitarianism.
2. The moral code that, if followed consistently by many people in a society, results in the greatest facilitation of peace and increasing material prosperity, is the one that is objectively good, except when judged by murder-loving psychopaths or total ascetics.
3. Though the root of a good moral code is ultimately utilitarianism, the only way that a good moral code can have desirable utilitarian effects is when it is treated not just as a means to greater utility, but as an end in and of itself by individual actors. This works with human psychology, in that it seems that humans feel a need for some kind of moral code so that by following it, they can think of themselves as ‘good’, as ‘righteous’, or as ‘heroes’. The job of the social thinker is to make sure that a moral code with positive utilitarian effects fulfils this role rather than one with negative utilitarian effects.
Conclusion
#1 and #2 follow because if we are faced with a choice between adopting one of
two moral codes, by what other standard could we judge the two then by their
likely utilitarian effects if adopted consistently by most members of society?
Let us say we are faced with the choice between a property rights-based moral
code (thou shall not kill, thou shall not steal, no fraud, reward through
contribution and ability, etc…) and an egalitarianism-based moral code
(economic equality is the most important good to be pursued, reward based on
needs rather than contribution and ability, etc…). Economic theory tells us
that a society where something closer to a property rights-based moral code
prevails will tend to be more peaceful and prosperous than a society where
something closer to an egalitarianism-based moral code prevails. Thus, the
former class of moral codes can be said to be objectively better for the vast majority of
people than the latter class of moral codes.
Complications
pop up when it comes time to nail down the real particulars of a moral code though:
will any exceptions to following it with consistency be tolerated? For example,
if a society adopts a property rights-based moral code, would it be considered
morally acceptable for a poor person on the actual edge of starvation to steal
some food, or to institutionalize this behaviour through a minimal,
government-provided social safety net? Would it be considered morally
acceptable for a government to violate people’s property rights and levy taxes,
if the purpose of the taxes was to better protect those property rights from
domestic criminals and foreign governments? What happens if we conclude (which
I think we potentially could) that allowing these limited exceptions would tend
to result in more utility for individual members of society overall?
Here, we
have a problem. The whole point of having a moral code is to induce people to
act, consistently, in a certain way that will ultimately lead to a greater
ability for all individuals to enhance their individual utilities. As such, it
must have a certain degree of rigidity to it. A moral code ceases to have any
utilitarian benefits if people are allowed to riddle holes in it merely because
they think that these constant modifications they make will actually lead to
more utilitarian benefits than the original code. Also, one of the merits of a
property rights-based moral code is that it assures people that certain
individual rights and property rights will be respected, which allows them to
plan for the future and improve their properties and minds without fear of a
‘moral revolution’, knowing that their rights will still be respected then.
People who just take it upon themselves to constantly ‘modify’ moral codes for
allegedly utilitarian purposes undermine the security of everyone in society,
whose rights and properties are constantly being threatened by these modifications.
The answer
lies in the consistent following of a good moral code being turned into an end
to be pursued for its own sake, rather than just a means to the end of
increasing utility in other ways. Luckily, human psychology, judging from the
observation of history, would seem to offer a way to do this. It would seem
that humans generally feel a need for some kind of moral code so that by
following it, they can think of themselves as ‘good’, as ‘just’, as
‘righteous’, or as ‘heroes’. Given this psychology, following a moral code
becomes not just a societal means of satisfying other ends the individual may
hold (such as having a car, eating ice cream, having a nice house, etc…) but
becomes an end in its own right, setting itself up on people’s value scales
alongside things like houses and cars. The job of the social thinker is to make
sure that a moral code with positive utilitarian effects fulfils this role
rather than one with negative utilitarian effects.
If this is
done then, for instance, the starving poor person alluded to earlier may still
steal the food to survive, but the moral code he has hopefully adopted along
with most of the other members of society will make him feel that this action
is morally wrong, albeit perhaps necessary. The same applies for the
government. It may perhaps be conceded that allowing a minimal government to do
certain things through the use of force would be beneficial in a utilitarian
sense, but that would have to be counterbalanced by the violations of the
generally-accepted, property rights-based moral code that such coercive actions
would entail. This attitude would go a long way towards checking any of the
excessive bloating of government that happened in the past, where this bloating
coincided with a gradual weakening of property rights-based moral codes and a
gradual strengthening of egalitarianism-based ones.
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